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Introduction
Scholarship on Muslim political mobilisation in the West has developed as an important counterpoint to public discourse, which, through a litany of events (e.g., the Rushdie Affair in Britain, the Danish cartoons controversy, the murder of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands, and the 438 C. R. Nagel and L. A. Staeheli '9/11' attacks in the United States) has cast Muslims as a threat to social cohesion, liberal democracy, and national security. While Western public discourse frequently portrays Muslims as being in conflict with liberal-democratic values, a growing body of academic literature has sought to show the ways that Muslims are, in fact, participating in national and local politics, seeking accommodation within existing arrangements between religious bodies and the state, and positioning Islam within mainstream narratives of belonging (Cesari 2004; Kastoryano 2004; Klausen 2005; Salvatore 2004 ). But even as this literature has shed light on political and civic participation among Muslims, it has sidelined the diversity of political identities and values that motivate them. Most, if not all, Muslims in the West find their identities politicised in some way, but the question of whether this leads to a consensus amongst Muslims about the role of religion in public life often remains unexamined.
In this article we draw on interviews with seventy-eight activists who are both Muslim and Arab to complicate ideas about the political mobilisation of Muslims in the West. These interviews were conducted in Britain and the United States as part of a study on the ways in which activists from Arab immigrant backgrounds articulate citizenship and put ideas about citizenship into practice in their communities.
1 These activists were not associated exclusively with Muslim organisations; rather, they were involved in a wide array of organisations, including hometown associations, Arab immigrant community centres, Islamic centres and organisations, as well as organisations that were not linked to either Arab or Muslim communities. The aim of the research, in this sense, was not to understand Muslim politics, per se, but to understand the ways in which a group of individuals who might identify themselves as Muslims 2 engage with and participate in public life.
In this article we demonstrate the diverse ways in which these activists articulate and enact religious and secular identities in their activism. While the focus of the research was not on Islam or Muslim identities, our study participants had a great deal to say about religion and the role of religion in public life. Many respondents, for instance, spoke about how their faith had guided their activism and inspired them to be 'active citizens'; almost all of the respondents were deeply concerned about the misrepresentation of Islam in the West. Respondents, however, were far from unified in their views on religion as a basis for political action and mobilisation. Some were keen to place Islam and Muslims squarely in mainstream political spaces; most, however, including some describing themselves as observant Muslims, were insistent that Islam should remain a private faith and identity and that political mobilisation should take place under the aegis of Arabness or other 'secular' identities. Emerging from their stories of activism is a sense of how interlocking identities create a range of possibilities for activism and political subjectivities. This complexity is frequently submerged in scholarly literatures, just as it is in public discourse.
Our aim in this article is to bring to light this complexity and to encourage a broader perspective on the ways in which people from Muslim backgrounds participate in public, political life in Western contexts. We begin with a critical overview of current scholarship on political and civic participation by Muslims in the West. This is followed by a more detailed description of the research and study population. Finally, we examine in detail our respondents' views on religion, identity, and activism, focusing on the ways they both contest religious identities and situate themselves in a complex array of political agendas and identities.
Muslims and political participation in Western contexts
In this section we provide a general overview of the growing body of literature on Muslim communities in Western liberal democracies, giving special attention to the British and American contexts as a means of providing some context for our empirical discussion. In tracing the broad contours of Muslims' involvement in politics, we indicate important components of political mobilisation that have been consistently overlooked. Our aim in the subsequent empirical analysis is to highlight the ambivalence that many Muslims feel about the political mobilisation of religious identities and to bring into focus the array of political identities and agendas that inform their participation in public life.
Muslim identities in the West
Many scholars note the relative unimportance of Muslim identities to post-World War II cohorts of labour migrants from the Arab world, South Asia, and Turkey (Cesari 2004; Glynn 2002; Haddad 1998) . Scholars generally agree that this situation has shifted dramatically since the 1980s, and they attribute the growing salience of Muslim identities to several interrelated factors that speak, first, to the racialisation of Muslim minorities by dominant groups and, second, to the construction and negotiation of new identities by Muslim minorities themselves.
In Europe Muslim minorities have experienced high levels of unemployment since the 1970s as a result of economic restructuring and industrial decline. Disregarding the dismal economic prospects of migrants and their descendents and drawing on an existing lexicon of Western cultural superiority vis-à-vis the Orient (Ewing 2003; Werbner 2000) , majority groups have often attributed unemployment, low academic achievement, and general social dislocation in Muslim communities to 'cultural' practices associated with Islam (Bowen 2007; Modood 2005) . In recent years dominant discourse has centred on the growing visibility of Islam in European space; headscarves and purpose-built mosques, in particular, are widely regarded as out of place and inimical to Western secular norms (Bowen 2007; Eade 1996) . At the same time, episodes of terrorism, however isolated, have heightened anxieties among majority groups that Muslims are permanent foreigners in their midst.
In Britain, more specifically, Muslim populations, most of whom are from Pakistani and Bangladeshi backgrounds, face some of the highest levels of social deprivation in Britain (Modood 1994) . But public discourse about Muslims has focused less on the material causes of deprivation than on the supposed cultural shortcomings of Muslims, of which arranged marriages, veiling, and residential 'self-segregation' are the most potent symbols (see Abbas 2007; Werbner 2000) . The issue of Muslim 'non-integration' emerged in the late 1980s, most notably after Muslim demonstrators publicly burned copies of Salman Rushdie's book, The Satanic Verses (1989) . This event signified for many commentators the fundamental inability of Muslims to accept the secular, liberal norms at the basis of British life (Asad 1990) . Such anxieties reached a fevered pitch in the wake of the terrorist attacks in London on 7 July 2005, which involved several young British Muslim men. Following this event (and the uncovering of other plots), Muslim neighbourhoods have been portrayed as potential breeding grounds of 'home-grown terrorists' and have come under intense surveillance. The general understanding of Muslims as a 'problem population'-one that is connected to irretrievably foreign practices and values-has informed the government's recent back-pedalling on multiculturalism and its initiation of more assimilatory 'social cohesion' policies (Phillips 2006; Kundnani 2008) .
The situation of Muslims in the United States is quite different from that of Muslims in Europe. To begin, the Muslim population in the United States is quite small relative to Muslim populations in European countries; the estimated 2.3 million Muslims in the United States constitute less than 1 percent of the total population; in contrast, Muslims make up about 10 percent of the French population and 3 percent of the British population (Djupe and Green 2007) . As in Europe, the majority of Muslims in the United States are from immigrant backgrounds.
3 However, Muslim Americans, while not uniformly affluent, are more likely than the general population to be in professional occupations, and they tend to live in middle-class suburban areas (see Djupe and Green 2007; Haddad 1998; Haddad and Lummis 1987; Pew Charitable Trust 2007) . Also in contrast to European Muslims, Muslim Americans have not been central to public debates about immigration and integration (Latinos are more visible in this respect). But despite their class status and their relative political invisibility, Muslim Americans have faced social and political marginalisation that stems from common perceptions about Islam as the enemy of Americaperceptions formed during the Iranian Revolution and reinforced with the attacks of 11 September 2001 (Joseph 1999; Naber 2000) . The repercussions of these stereotypes on Muslims in America, from harassment and airport profiling to the deportation of thousands of 'Middle Eastern' men in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, have been widely documented (Howell and Shyrock 2003; Abdo 2006) . Dominant groups in many Western contexts, then, have had a major hand in constructing Muslim identities in a manner that generally has stigmatised Muslim people. But Muslims themselves have also had an active role in shaping their identities, and Muslim activists have responded in a variety of ways to their marginalisation. Many scholars have noted the growing propensity among Muslims worldwide to identify with a global community of believers (or ummah) and to seek societal renewal through Islam (MacLeod 1991; Woltering 2002; Mandaville 2009 ). This trend has been especially pronounced among the children and grandchildren of Arab, Turkish, and South Asian immigrants, who are seeking a 'purer' form of Islam than that practiced by their parents-a form of religiosity that is both highly observant and attuned to the imperatives of rational, modern life (Bowen 2007; Leonard 2005; Cesari 2004; Glynn 2002; Naber 2005; Kundnani 2008) . As Muslims in the West have coalesced around their religious identity, they have also articulated political aims with reference to Islam (Leonard 2003; Haddad 1998; Cesari 2004; also Soysal 1997) . Some of the literature has emphasised the transnational components of Muslims' political consciousness and activism (see, for instance, Bowen 2004; Mandaville 2001 Mandaville , 2009 Werbner 2002) . Most of the literature, though, has focused on Muslims' engagement with mainstream institutions at the local and/or national scale (Klausen 2005; Leonard 2003; McLoughlin 2005; Modood 2003; Roy 2004) .
Most discussions of Muslim activism and mobilisation focus on the European context, where even in the most 'secular' of contexts, there are often official and informal arrangements between the state and religious organisations (Salvatore 2004; Soper and Fetzer 2007) . In the British context scholars have commented on negotiations between Muslim organisations and the state to secure state funding for Islamic schools (Parker-Jenkins 2002) and the training of imams (Klausen 2005) , and on interactions between Muslim leaders and local planning councils relating to mosque construction (Gale 2004; Naylor and Ryan 2002) . Some attention has also been given to Muslim participation in electoral politics (Glynn 2008; Kahani-Hopkins and Hopkins 2002) . A key point raised in the British literature is that while Muslims remain peripheral to the race-based multicultural system created in the 1970s, they nevertheless are deeply engaged in the politics of recognition, self-representation, and parity with non-Muslim groups (see Modood 2005) .
Though given less scholarly attention, relations between Muslim organisations and the state are also relevant to the United States context, where religion pervades political discourse and public life despite a constitutional separation between 'church' and state. Muslim organisations have emerged in recent years that aim to give Muslims a legitimate place at America's 'multicultural table' (cf. Kurien 2007) and to secure for Muslims a voice in the country's pluralistic political system. Large national groups like the Council of American Islamic Relations and the Muslim Public Affairs Council foster relations with government officials and mobilise against local and national laws that might discriminate against Muslims and other religious minorities. They also work to have Muslims included in important symbolic occasions, including the annual 'national day of prayer' events and the opening sessions of state legislatures. Muslim activists have scored some small but significant symbolic victories in recent years: the postal service, for instance, has issued Eid postage stamps since 2001, and the White House has for several years marked the breaking of the Ramadan fast. Muslim organisations today conceive of the Muslim population as an important voting bloc, akin to Latinos, Asians, and other 'ethnic' groups, and their influence is felt in states like Michigan, which has a sizeable Arab-Muslim population.
Current scholarship, then, presents a complex view of Muslims and political life that recognises the interplay between host society political institutions and discourses, social and political trends in the wider Islamic world, and Muslim political agency in local and national contexts. This scholarship is highly attuned to the debates and differences that exist among Muslims about how they should engage the broader public, with whom they should forge alliances, and what distinguishes their agenda and their message as Islamic (Mandaville 2009; Phillips and Iqbal 2006; Klausen 2005; Kosnick 2004; Warner and Wenner 2006) . This, in conjunction with an associated literature on the dynamics of gender, class, and generation in the expression of Muslim identities (e.g., Hopkins 2007; Dwyer 1999) provides the basis to challenge images of monolithic, homogenous Muslim communities that circulate in public discourse (Ehrkamp 2007 ).
Yet this literature also obscures the fact that many Muslims participate in politics that are not rooted in Islamic principles or beliefs. Muslim identities may have overshadowed secular identities and ideologies embraced by earlier generations of Muslims in the West, but that should not imply that all Muslims regard religion as a valid public identity (Leonard 2005) or that other, non-religious identities are irrelevant to their political consciousness. We point here to Ruba Salih's (2004) account of Muslim activists in Italy, whose desire to represent themselves in pluralistic terms is constantly frustrated by the dominant society's tendency to regard all Muslims first and foremost as Muslims (typically categorised either as 'Islamists' or 'moderates'). Salih's analysis suggests that Muslims are often compelled to explain and to defend their religion to members of the majority; in this sense, being politically Muslim is almost inescapable. Yet a sense of Muslimness is not always what motivates them politically, and the 'Muslim community' might not be the public they address or mobilise through their activism. That not all Muslims identify politically as Muslims is frequently mentioned in the current literature (e.g., Modood 2003; Mandaville 2009 ), but rarely is this point given due regard.
Muslim political mobilisation and the contested public realm
Salih's observations prompt us to look beyond Muslim political mobilisation in the West and to think more abstractly about the public realm itself and the ways in which individuals and groups (re)present themselves and make claims in public, political life. Theoretical discussions of the 'public sphere,' we wish to suggest, are especially useful in informing our understandings of political participation and identity among Muslims in the West. The public sphere can be conceived of as a communicative realm that demarcates the political life of a citizenry; as the term suggests, it is often imagined as resting on a division between public and private interest (cf. Habermas 1989). Whether we are looking at Western liberal political theory or at political discourse, the idea of the public sphere speaks to an expectation of egalitarianism in the sense that all citizens enter the public as equals. But, as feminist theorists note, many social groups are excluded from or marginalised in the public because they are seen to lack the autonomy and rationality necessary for participation in the public sphere or because they are seen as a threat to liberal democratic values (Fraser 1990 ). This, as we have seen, is certainly the case for Muslim groups. Yet Muslims and other subordinate groups do participate in public life, and their participation makes evident that 'the public' is, in fact, constituted by multiple publics, or 'counterpublics.' These publics emerge through activism and other modes of public address to contest the boundaries of, and terms of engagement in, the broader, unmarked public (Warner 2002) .
Recognising the contested nature of the public sphere leads us to explore the complex intersections between publics and individual identities. Individuals embody multiple identities and subject positions that may be aligned with different publics at different times or simultaneously. Multiple subjectivities, in this sense, create a range of possibilities for activism, mobilisation, and political identity rather than a single trajectory (Mouffe 1995) . We are led, therefore, to ask how Muslims might be actively situating themselves in a diversity of publics and participating in public life not only as Muslims, but as women, people of colour, as ethnic or racial minorities, and so on. Moreover, we are led to ask how Muslims might contest their assigned membership in particular social categories and how they might seek to create alternative public identities that are explicitly divorced from religion. Without attention to the different political identities and aims that are present among Muslims-the different ways they approach the public sphere and make claims upon 'the public,' as well as the different ways they imagine the public sphere and the legitimacy of particular identities within it-efforts to challenge the essentialisation of Muslim communities remain incomplete.
In the following analysis we first explore the contested nature of Muslim identities, drawing attention to the lack of agreement among our study respondents about the appropriateness of religion as a basis for political mobilisation. Second, we highlight the multiple political subjectivities present among our participants, both those who embrace and those who eschew a public Muslim identity. By exposing debates among a particular group of Muslims about religion in the public realm and by situating them in a diverse set of political stances and agendas, this account attempts to de-centre religious identities in current discussions of Muslim mobilisation in Western contexts. First, we describe the research on which our analysis is based.
About the research and the study population
The following account is based on semistructured interviews with Arab American and British Arab activists conducted between 2002 and 2006 as part of a comparative study to evaluate the ways in which Arab Americans and British Arabs construct ideas about citizenship in local, national, and transnational contexts, and the ways in which they act upon these ideas through organisational participation. As we noted previously, however, our conversations almost inevitably turned to the intersections of religious, ethnic, and immigrant identities. Although we identified most of our respondents by their participation in Arabidentified organisations, they reminded us that their identities and subject positions were much more complex. Their political outlooks, goals, and activism were similarly complex, particularly in terms of their ideas about public Muslim identities and the roles that religion might play in their activism. Respondents spoke at length on the ways they understand the connection between being Arab and being Muslim, how they interpret 'secularism,' how they conceptualise the role of religion in public life, and how they situate Muslimness within an array of other identities.
National contexts
The research we present here involved a comparison of the experiences of Arab immigrants in the United States and the United Kingdom. The national comparison is not central to our argument in this article, although there are times in which national contexts are important to the way respondents frame their activism. In both countries we were interested in the ways that complex identities rooted in immigration status, ethnicity, and religion shape activists' articulations of citizenship and the strategies through which they assert political voice.
In the United States, estimates of the size of the Arab-origin population vary between 1.3 million, according to the 2000 United States Census (de la Cruz and Bittingham 2003) and 3.5 million, according to several large Arab American organisations. Many Arab Americans are the second-and third-generation descendents of Christians from present-day Lebanon. Since the late 1960s these well-established communities have been joined by growing numbers of immigrants, many if not most of them Muslim, from Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, Yemen, and other Arab states. In Britain there are believed to be 250,000 to 400,000 British Arabs, and anecdotal evidence suggests that they are predominantly Muslim. Both Arab Americans and British Arabs tend to be relatively prosperous and well educated, although there are segments that face high levels of deprivation in both countries, including Yemeni and Iraqi refugees in the United States and working-class Moroccan and Yemeni communities in Britain.
Study population
We spoke with a total of 105 activists for this study, about a quarter of whom-almost all of them Arab Americans-were from Christian Arab backgrounds. The presence of Christian Arabs is central to particular articulations of 'secular' identity, as we explain below. But because our aim in this particular article is to disentangle the identities and aims of Muslim people, we deal only with those of our respondents (78 individuals) who described themselves as Muslim. In total, about 60 percent of our respondents were first-generation immigrants; the remaining 40 percent were born and/or raised in Britain or the United States. Reflecting the composition of Arab populations in Britain and the United States, most of our British Arab respondents were of Palestinian, Egyptian, Iraqi, and Yemeni origin, whereas the majority of our Arab American respondents were of Lebanese and Palestinian origin. About one-third of our respondents were female. All of the individuals interviewed for this study were highly educated and middle to upper-middle class, although a few of our British respondents came from working-class backgrounds.
We recruited most of our respondents through Arab-identified organisations and activities, but we also spoke with sixteen Arab-origin individuals who reported varying degrees of participation in Muslimoriented organisations. These organisations included three large, highprofile lobbying/public relations organisations, two large Islamic centres (one serving a low-income inner-city community and the other serving a relatively affluent, multicultural suburban community), and two smaller, relatively informal groups that operate through Arabdominated mosques. Of these sixteen individuals, we recruited nine (all of them in the United States) by directly contacting Muslim organisations that we knew included people of Arab backgrounds; the others were referred to us by other study participants, or we subsequently learned about their involvement in Muslim organisations (the participation of individual activists in Muslim and non-Muslim groups is an important point to which we will return).
The fact that we recruited most of our respondents through Araboriented organisations has an obvious effect on our findings: it is not surprising that most of our respondents in the larger study identified themselves as Arabs. Given the nature of our sample, we do not wish to suggest that our findings can be generalised to a larger Arab and/or Muslim population. We do suggest, though, that the multiple layers of identity that we found even in this 'unrepresentative' sample give us pause to consider the very different ways that being Muslim can inform-or not inform-political consciousness and action.
Debating the place of Muslim identity in political activism
It is clear that being a Muslim is an important component of the identities of our respondents. It informs their political consciousness, their sense of morality, and their understanding of social justice. For instance, Badra, 4 a second-generation Arab American activist and civil rights attorney, describes Islam as having provided the role models-including Khadija, the Prophet Mohammed's first wife-for her political activism. And Huda, a second-generation Arab American involved in immigrant-rights and gay Arab organisations, states that religion has been a 'big part of my politicisation': I feel like I learned at a pretty young age, through my Muslim education . . . that that was where I could engage with those questions 'What am I here for?' 'What's life about?' . . . And I felt like I was here to question authority, don't take anything for granted, don't take anything at face value, and that was a big part of my spiritual and religious education.
Our respondents are also deeply sensitive to the demonisation of Muslims and to misconceptions about Islam in public discourse, and they recognise religion to be an issue of public, political concern. Hassan, a young Egyptian-born man active in a Los Angeles-based Arab American civil rights organisation, speaks for many of our respondents when he states, You look around you and there are two hundred channels and so many newspapers, but it's like there's only one message, there's only one side to this story-and that's that [Muslims] are born somewhat militant, that they live in an inferior culture, that Islam teaches this and that-by people who know nothing about Islam. And they classify us as 'fundamentalist', 'moderates', 'liberals'-you know, if you think a certain way, you're kind of accepted as civil; if you don't think that way, you're extremist or uncivil or backward.
For some of our respondents-mainly a group of younger and second-generation individuals involved in Muslim organisations-this personal commitment to Islam, and the desire to address negative stereotypes, translates into efforts to bring Muslim identities into the public sphere and to make these identities the basis of political mobilisation and political claims. Consistent with the literature on contemporary Muslim identities, these individuals speak of themselves first and foremost as Muslims and view national and ethnic identities as narrower and as more exclusionary than Islam. As one respondent remarks, These activists endeavour to move Islam away from the margins of public life by encouraging mainstream institutions and sectors to acknowledge the Muslim community. They engage in a number of public relations and outreach efforts that attempt to place Islam more squarely in the public eye, including distributing reading material on Islam to public libraries, holding 'open house' events at mosques, participating in interfaith networks and events, and creating advertising material (e.g., billboards) that project a positive image of Muslims.
For most of our interviewees, though, even for many who describe themselves as observant or as deeply attached to their Muslim faith, Islam does not serve as the basis of political claims or political mobilisation. Many of these interviewees insist that religion is personal to them-that it is essentially part of one's private life. For instance, Ron, a San Francisco activist involved in a group for gay Arab Americans, describes himself as a "very religious person" but insists that religion is "a very personal thing." He states, For Rafiya, as well, religion is a personal, rather than a public or political, matter. Rafiya, a young woman born in Sheffield, England, to working-class Yemeni parents, is more comfortable with visible markers of Muslimness than Ron is; she wears a hijab, and she places her Muslim identity before her Yemeni-Arab identity, stating, "I connect more with my religion than I do with my culture because I think that my culture's completely messed up." She also recognises that Muslim identity can take on a political dimension "when you see what goes on" in the British media. Yet she insists that her Muslim identity is a personal matter and that it is not the focus of her activism: "It's personal for me. This is what I believe in . . . I've not bothered what other people think and what's going on in the media and everything. It just makes you stronger and closer to your religion."
Thus, while some of our respondents are eager to bring Muslim identities into the public sphere, most of them envision and uphold a relatively clear boundary between religious belief and public, political life, even as they recognise the politicisation of religion in public discourse. The significance of this imagined boundary for activism comes into focus when we look at the ways respondents talk about their goals for their 'communities.' Most of these individuals described here were recruited through Arab-oriented organisations, so it is not surprising that they often speak about 'community' in terms of an Arab (and/or British Arab/Arab American) community that includes both Muslims and Christians. This understanding of an inclusive, nonsectarian Arab community has a long history that can be traced, in part, to the social and ideological milieu of the Arab world in the 1950s and 1960s, in which many of our first-generation respondents came of age politically.
5 Several first-generation immigrants we interviewed described the influence of secular nationalisms, including the Palestine resistance movement and pan-Arabism, on their political consciousness. After settling in the United States and Britain, these individuals, along with some Christian Arabs, 6 joined or helped to create organisations dealing with issues that they framed as Arab issues such as the occupation of Palestine, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Intifada, and the first Gulf War (for a fuller discussion, see Suleiman 1999) . For these individuals, a strong, unified voice remains crucial to effecting change in American and British foreign policy in the Arab world, as well as to maintaining Arab cultural identity in the West.
The shared sense of Arabs as a single people despite regional and religious differences, it must be emphasised, continues to resonate with younger, second-generation activists in the United States and Britain, who see themselves as serving multifaith Arab communities and as addressing Arab political issues. Second-generation Arab identity might not be the same as the pan-Arabism of the 1950s and 1960s; the key point, though, is that many young activists feel that they face a particular set of issues as Arabs. Ongoing sectarian conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, and elsewhere, and apparent rifts between Christian and Muslim Arabic-speaking groups, especially in the United States, have reinforced their belief in the imperative of unity under the banner of a non-sectarian Arab identity.
A common refrain in these interviews, therefore, is inclusiveness and non-sectarianism: respondents emphasise that their activities include people from different religious backgrounds, because Arabness encompasses and supersedes religious differences. (This is an interesting counterpoint to the views of Muslim activists, described above, who argue that Muslim identities are more inclusive than Arab identities). As first-generation Arab American activist Ramzi states "Arab-Americans, whether Muslims, or Christians, whether Syrian, Lebanese, Iraqis, have one thing in common; Arab culture . . . Our value system is in common. It encompasses Muslim and Christian Arabs." Likewise, Nasir, a Palestinian immigrant who created an annual Arab American festival in California, states of his efforts, What I wanted to do is to have a holiday for all the Arabs . . . All religion and all colours. It's open. When you say Arab American Day, you don't say Muslim or Christian or Jew; we say Arab American . . . Religion is not our case here to sell. What we're selling there is to make peace between all these Arabs and make a union between them . . .
There are, to be sure, other political considerations lurking beneath the surface in the insistence upon the separation between private religion and public activism. Among some of our British respondents, in particular, the insistence on secular Arab identities also signals an aversion to stigmatised Muslim groups, especially Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities. For many of our British respondents, the insistence on the privacy of religion reflects awareness that the term 'British Muslim' has become a category associated, however unfairly, with isolated, radicalised, inner-city Asian communities (Abbas 2007) . Lotfi, for instance, is an Iraqi-born physician and aspiring lobbyist in Britain who speaks disparagingly of the government's propensity to "slot Arabs into a religious grouping as Muslims" and blames Asiancontrolled organisations, in part, for the government's intransigence in granting Arabs their own census category. British-born Suha is equally vexed by this situation. Arguing that Pakistani Muslims "have a very rigid approach to their religion," she contends that "organisations like the Muslim Council of Britain, definitely do not, by any stretch of the imagination, represent British Arabs. They represent a completely different community." Indeed, for Suha, "an Arab Christian and an Arab Jew and an Arab Muslim together will have a lot more in common than an Arab Muslim and a Pakistani Muslim."
In sum, our interviews reveal a lack of agreement about the role of religion in the public sphere. While some of our interviewees embrace a Muslim identity and seek to place this identity firmly in public life and in mainstream narratives of belonging, others reject what they see to be the politicisation of Islam. For the latter, political mobilisation is predicated on placing religion in a personal, private realm, where it will neither disrupt unity among Arabs nor cause them to be associated with stigmatised Muslim groups. The growing attention given to the mobilisation of Muslims tends to obscure these politics and the contested nature of religious identities they represent.
Pluralising Muslims' political subjectivity
We have, then, an important division among our respondents that revolves around the place of religion in the public sphere. But there is more to the story than this. Whether we are looking at those who identify politically as Muslims or those who reject this identity, we can see that they do not confine themselves to any single category of identity. Our respondents who identify as Arabs, in other words, also might identify as members of the 'ethnic minority community' or as 'people of color'; likewise, those who identify as Muslims might identify as progressives or, indeed, as Arabs. This multiple political subjectivity is reflected in the fact that individuals are often involved in a variety of organisations, networks, and coalitions and in the fact that they often use an abstract language of human rights and citizenship to connect themselves to various publics, including the public at-large.
As described above, most of our respondents identify themselves as Arab and are primarily concerned with Arab communities, whether they are located in the Arab world or in the country of settlement. At the same time, though, these Arab-oriented activists situate their activism in other kinds of political agendas. In the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, for instance, Arab American activists have not only mobilised against United States military action in Iraq but have also become deeply engaged with domestic political issues, including civil rights and immigrant rights. Their opposition to domestic surveillance, mass deportations, and airport profiling has brought Arab activists into working relationships with groups like the American Civil Liberties Union and a number of minority, immigrant, and progressive organisations. Some of our respondents, we should note, are also involved in gay organisations, women's organisations, and 'Black community' forums. Indeed, some of our respondents insist that their activism is not about Arabness, per se, but about the rights of citizens and/or human rights. This comes out very clearly in our interview with Asif, a California-based activist who was involved in anti-NAFTA and anti-apartheid organising in the 1980s and 1990s and has since been involved in struggles to preserve affirmative action (which does not cover Arab Americans) and to combat anti-immigrant sentiment in his state. When asked to define the community he serves through his activism, he replies, Can it be specifically identified? My sense is that yes, I am an ArabAmerican, maybe from one perspective, at least from the perspective of the security apparatus [in the US]; therefore I belong to that identity group. But, [for immigrants], identity tends to be a way of coalescing, as a way to try to find similarity and commonality. For me, that was never an issue. I did not seek a coalescing as a way of trying to affirm my identity and who I am. I serve the community [where there are] issues of injustice that need to be addressed, regardless of who is involved.
This kind of complexity is just as evident among those involved in Muslim organisations, who are also engaged in building coalitions and networks with subordinate groups, including Latinos, Asians, immigrant workers, and other religious minorities. Activists view coalition building as crucial to reducing the isolation experienced by Muslim communities. Thus, Nasiba, a young woman active in a progressive Muslim organisation, states, [Our aim] is really trying to get our communities out of this practice of isolation. Because a lot of times we only associate with ourselves, so it's this idea of really building coalitions, alliances, and not just caring about the Muslim issue or the Arab issue but really caring about all issues that affect the American population.
Similar to what we have seen above with activists like Asif, these activists position Islam within a larger repertoire of values and political stances relating to human rights, civil rights, and social justice. One young female activist who works with Nasiba, for instance, contends that "because of the alliances that we're making, slowly but surely, people are realising that [Muslim activism] is more than just a religious issue; it's far beyond that. It's an issue of oppression and injustice really." Nasiba expands on this sentiment, saying, "That's one of the things about [this organisation]. Our community isn't just because you have a label as Muslim. Our community is because you share these values and you are working for a similar vision of justice, peace, dignity . . . " Thus, while Islam is central to the political aims and identities of these respondents, ideas about Islam and about being Muslim become couched in a vocabulary that is intended to connect Muslims to other groups.
If the boundaries of Muslim minority politics become blurred by these linkages and by the ways in which activists discursively position themselves, they are further blurred by the multiple involvements of individual activists. Some of our respondents who are involved in Muslim organisations are also involved in groups concerned with social justice and minority rights; some, indeed, are involved in Arab-based organisations. Rafik, for instance, has been an advocate of Islamic education in state schools in Birmingham, where he lives, but he also has been involved in an organisation for inner-city Arab youth in Birmingham, in a Black Community Forum, and in a local group that assists minority groups in forming non-profit organisations. Likewise, Fatih, an active member of a San Francisco-based Islamic centre, participates in statewide labour union organising activities and in an Arab American civil rights organisation.
The complex positioning of Muslim activists in the public sphere can also be seen in interviewees' insistence on setting aside their Muslim identities to engage with the 'wider public.' Muslims, they argue, should participate in the public sphere not just as Muslims but as 'ordinary citizens.' They emphasise the civic responsibilities that Muslims have to the society at-large-responsibilities that require Muslims to think of themselves as 'average Americans' or as 'British citizens' and to concern themselves with issues affecting the larger community of which they are part. For instance, Jamila, an American-born activist at a Washington, DC, area Islamic centre, states, There are millions [of Muslims] who are still thinking of issues back home . . . and they're not thinking of getting involved in or having a conversation about or developing their activities to be involved in the whole range of issues that would affect the average American. I believe that one of the things that helps people develop a sense of identity and [to feel] moored in the place they are living in, is when they are thinking on multiple levels of themselves as part of all those issues that affect everyone, whether it's transportation or the hospitals and the quality of the public schools.
Similarly, Adel, a leader in an Islamic centre in the San Francisco area states, "[While we are Muslims], we are also American, and what goes on in the city affects us and affects our kids, and there are issues like education-you cannot tackle this issues alone as an Islamic institution, you have to tackle it as a community."
The key point we are making here is that categories like 'Muslim' and 'Arab' are not freestanding, self-contained entities. Those who identify with these categories operate in a pluralistic public sphere that requires them to address, engage with, and find affinities with other groups and with the broader public at-large. This point is an especially important one with respect to Muslim activists, given the tendency in the literature and in public discourse to fixate on Muslim identities at the expense of others. Through their participation in networks and coalitions, their membership in multiple organisations, and their efforts to explain their aims a language of citizenship, human rights, and civil rights, the Muslim activists with whom we spoke position themselves not only as Muslims but also (however strategically or partially) as minorities, citizens, Americans/British, 'people of faith,' Arabs, and so on. The overlapping and intersecting nature of identities and activities indicates that 'Muslim' as a political category lacks the clarity and cohesiveness that is attributed to it in the current literature.
Conclusion
Current scholarship on Muslim minorities has examined the highly fraught contexts in which Muslims have sought to carve a political space in Western societies, and it has brought attention to efforts among Muslims to negotiate the structures of belonging that exist in different national contexts. This literature provides an important counterpoint to public discourse, which persistently questions the ability and willingness of Muslims to participate in the public sphere. But the growing attention given to Muslim minority politics-to the political mobilisation of Muslims as Muslims-also tends to obscure the different ways that members of Muslim minority groups participate (or attempt to participate) in the public realm.
We have attempted in this article to give a multilayered understanding of the political subjectivity of Muslims and the different ways they position themselves within the public sphere. In doing so our aim has been to challenge current scholarship to look beyond 'Muslimness' as the sole, defining feature of Muslims' politics. 'Muslim,' we have demonstrated, is a highly contested category. Muslims can identify with Islam in very different ways, and there is a lack of consensus about the role of religion and religious identities in the public sphere. At the same time, Muslims, whether they identify politically as such, navigate a fluid public sphere that is replete with political identities, agendas, and discourses.
Our aim here is not to downplay the mobilisation of Muslim identities. We agree with Modood (2003) , who argues that the diversity within social concepts like 'Muslim minority' is not reason to abandon these concepts. But we believe that it is equally important to encourage a broader understanding of the political claims and identities put forward by Muslims, and this inevitably leads to a destabilisation of the category of 'Muslim minority.' Muslims, in short, can be Muslims, but they can also be many other things. It is perhaps a simple point, but one that has become increasingly important in today's political climate, in which Muslims-whether labelled as 'good' ones or 'bad' ones-are regarded as essentially Muslim.
